This four-part series, “The Great Synthesis or a Gradual Convergence? Rethinking the Origins of Islamic Legal Theory,” revisits a familiar narrative in the history of Islamic law. For decades, scholars have told the story of two rival camps—the ahl al-raʾy (the “people of reason”) and the ahl al-ḥadīth (the “people of tradition”)—locked in intellectual battle until al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) brokered a decisive compromise, a “Great Synthesis” that shaped the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence.
But was the divide really so sharp? Were these groups as polarized as later accounts suggest, or were they always closer in practice? By examining both classical doctrines and modern scholarship, this series argues for a more nuanced view: one of proximity, overlap, and gradual convergence rather than stark opposition.
When students first encounter the history of Islamic law, they often hear of a fierce intellectual battle between two rival camps: the ahl al-raʾy and the ahl al-ḥadīth. The ahl al-raʾy are usually identified with the scholars of Kufa and Iraq, who emphasized reasoned opinion, analogy (qiyās), and systematic principles to extend the law to new cases. The ahl al-ḥadīth, based largely in Medina, are portrayed as textualists who insisted on grounding the law directly in transmitted reports from the Prophet.
The Encyclopaedia of Islam frames this divide as one between jurists who “promoted the use of independent legal reasoning to arrive at legal decisions” (ahl al-raʾy) and those who held that “only traditions from the Prophet be used for the law” (ahl al-ḥadīth). In this telling, the two camps were so different that their approaches were fundamentally irreconcilable.
This is where al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) enters the story. He is said to have resolved the conflict by synthesizing the two approaches into a unified legal theory. By requiring that reasoning be anchored in Qurʾān and authentic hadith, and by laying down systematic principles (uṣūl al-fiqh) to govern interpretation, al-Shāfiʿī created a new scholarly consensus. This achievement has been described by Wael Hallaq as nothing less than a “Great Synthesis” (Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 7).
Hallaq is one of the most influential voices in framing the origins of Islamic legal theory. In The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005), he describes the history of Islam between 150/767 and 350/961 as marked by conflict between these two groups, culminating in their reconciliation. For him, the “Great Synthesis” was not only a legal turning point but also a cultural one: it reflected a broader social transformation in which hadith gained unrivaled authority.
His portrayal is dramatic. He speaks of a “war” between rationalists and traditionalists, of repeated “battles” in which one side gained the upper hand, and of the eventual victory of a middle ground. The ahl al-raʾy, he says, were “too libertarian” to survive on their own. By the third/ninth century, hadith had become indispensable. At the other pole, the radical traditionalism of figures like Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was “too austere and rigid” to last, and had to moderate.
This kind of story has a certain dialectical flavor: conflict, tension, and then reconciliation into something new. It’s not Hallaq’s own language, but his framing echoes familiar intellectual patterns that resemble a thesis–antithesis–synthesis arc often associated with Hegelian thought.
Critics argue this story is too neat. One problem is methodological: Hallaq relies heavily on biographical dictionaries, which record teachers and reputations, but tell us little about doctrines. A jurist could study with a traditionist and still employ reasoning, or cite hadith extensively while also using analogy.
This risks exaggerating polarity. The terms ahl al-raʾy and ahl al-ḥadīth may reflect polemical labels, not solid identities. Joseph Schacht suggested that “ahl al-raʾy” was never a self-designated school but a term used by critics. Moreover, Hallaq’s portrayal of figures like Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal as purely anti-reason seems overstated. Evidence from his students shows that Aḥmad often extrapolated principles from hadith and applied them analogically—showing flexibility.
So why has the “Great Synthesis” story lasted? Partly because it gives a clear origin story for uṣūl al-fiqh and casts al-Shāfiʿī as a unifying genius. It also mirrors familiar intellectual patterns: conflict followed by reconciliation is a compelling narrative arc. But intellectual history is often messier. Evidence suggests both groups were already closer in practice: both used hadith and reasoning, differing only in emphasis.
This debate shapes how we understand Islamic law’s character. If it was born out of conflict, then its systemization was a fragile truce. If the divide was never so sharp, then Islamic law emerges as a tradition of spectrum, overlap, and negotiation from the start. That difference matters for how Muslims today view their legal heritage—whether as polarized or as organically plural.
In the next installment, we turn to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, often seen as the archetypal traditionalist hostile to reason. Yet a closer look reveals a jurist who employed analogy and reasoning in subtle ways. If even Aḥmad used raʾy-like methods, then perhaps the gulf between ahl al-raʾy and ahl al-ḥadīth was never as wide as supposed.
- Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Ahl al-Raʾy”
- Christopher Melchert, “Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 3 (2001): 383–406
- Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 1950)
